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The paper focuses on the essentials of psychoanalytic process and change and the
question of how the neural correlates and mechanisms of psychodynamic psychotherapy
can be investigated. The psychoanalytic approach aims at enabling the patient to
“remember, repeat, and work through” concerning explicit memory. Moreover, the
relationship between analyst and patient establishes a new affective configuration
which enables a reconstruction of the implicit memory. If psychic change can be
achieved it corresponds to neuronal transformation. Individualized neuro-imaging requires
controlling and measuring of variables that must be defined. Two main methodological
problems can be distinguished: the design problem addresses the issue of how to
account for functionally related variables in an experimentally independent way. The
translation problem raises the question of how to bridge the gaps between different
levels of the concepts presupposed in individualized neuro-imaging (e.g., the personal
level of the therapist and the client, the neural level of the brain). An overview
of individualized paradigms, which have been used until now is given, including
Operationalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD-2) and the Maladaptive Interpersonal
Patterns Q-Start (MIPQS). The development of a new paradigm that will be used in
fMRI experiments, the “Interpersonal Relationship Picture Set” (IRPS), is described.
Further perspectives and limitations of this new approach concerning the design and the
translation problem are discussed.
Keywords: psychoanalytic process, psychodynamic psychotherapy, individualizedneuro-imaging, design problem,
translation problem, Interpersonal Relationship Picture Set (IRPS), Operationalized Psychodynamic Diagnosis
(OPD-2)
INTRODUCTION
NEUROBIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
The recently emerged dialog between psychoanalysis and neuro-
science (Shevrin et al., 1992; Solms et al., 1998; Kandel, 1999;
Beutel et al., 2003; Northoff, 2007; Northoff et al., 2007) led
to several empirical hypotheses and investigations of psychody-
namic concepts like defense mechanisms (Shevrin et al., 2002;
Boeker et al., 2006; Northoff, 2007), self (Milrod, 2002), mem-
ories (Gabbard, 2000; Mancia, 2006; Peres et al., 2008), dreams
(Solms, 1995, 2000; Andrade, 2007), empathy (Gallese et al.,
2007). While these originally psychodynamic concepts are cur-
rently investigated in the neuroscientific context, the neural basis
of core elements of psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy has not been elucidated yet.
Though neurobiological changes in some single cases
undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy have been reported
(Viinamäki et al., 1998; Overbeck et al., 2004; Saarinen et al.,
2005; Lai et al., 2007; Lehto et al., 2008; Kessler et al., 2011a, 2012),
systematic and well-controlled brain imaging studies of the neural
effects of psychodynamic psychotherapy are still lacking.
In contrast to psychodynamic psychotherapy, the neural effects
of other forms of psychotherapy like cognitive behavioral ther-
apy (CBT) and interpersonal therapy (IPT) have been studied
in brain imaging more often (see Roffman et al., 2005; Linden,
2006; Beauregard, 2007; Frewen et al., 2008; for reviews). These
studies demonstrated neural modulation in various brain regions
encompassing subcortical as well as medial and lateral corti-
cal regions during predominantly cognitive-emotion regulation
tasks before and after CBT or IPT. Interpretation of these find-
ings is however constrained by various methodological problems;
these include issues like objectification and quantification of the
effects of psychotherapy in behavioral and subjective parameters,
selection of the activation task in functional imaging, appropri-
ate control groups, physiological, behavioral, and psychological
variables indicating task-specific effects of neural stimulation, dis-
tinction between the target symptom and its possible underlying
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 355 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Boeker et al. Psychodynamic psychotherapy in individualized neuro-imaging
psychodynamic processes, etc. (see Frewen et al., 2008, for a
detailed discussion).
While brain imaging studies of both CBT and IPT are already
confronted with numerous methodological problems, the situ-
ation is even more difficult in the case of psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy. For instance, the therapeutic relationship, including
transference and counter-transference, plays a much more essen-
tial role in psychodynamic psychotherapy than in CBT and IPT;
this makes it necessary to include the client-therapist relationship
as an intervening variable in neural analysis. Another problem
is the conceptualization of psychodynamic phenomena like ego,
defense mechanisms, etc., and their translation into psychological
variables for subsequent experimental testing in functional brain
imaging. The neuropsychoanalyst who wants to study the neural
effects of psychodynamic psychotherapy is thus confronted with
numerous and highly complex input variables that he needs to
account and control in order to make reliable and valid investiga-
tions of the output, the neural effects, possible.
ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS AND CHANGE
To this end, it is necessary to describe and characterize the essen-
tial and specific aspects that account for the process and change of
a patient during a psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychother-
apy. This could be the basis for the development of meaningful
research designs and paradigms. The main questions in this
respect are:
- What is the process and what is changed within a psychoanaly-
sis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy?
- Which are the mechanisms, techniques, and actions that enable
psychoanalytic process and change?
Patients mostly seek psychotherapy because of distress, i.e., they
suffer from psychic symptoms, dysfunctional behaviors, and/or
from disturbances in their psychosocial environment (interper-
sonal problems, in relationships, at work etc.) with the intention
to reduce and resolve the distress. Often patients also aim to
achieve a greater self-understanding. Others wish to be supported
emotionally and personally or receive guidance and instructions
from the therapist for resolving their problems.
The specific aspects concerning the therapeutic process and
change in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy
address not only symptoms and dysfunctional behaviors. Another
objective is to find out what may lie behind them. This is
connected to the fundamental psychoanalytic concept that con-
scious, so-called “manifest” symptoms, thoughts and actions of
the patient imply an unconscious “latent” meaning and motiva-
tion. Within a psychoanalytic perspective, conscious symptoms,
and disturbances are assumed to be the result of mechanisms
of defense and formations of compromise, which deal with
multiple pre-conscious or unconscious factors. Such dynamics
have a strong impact on how one thinks, feels, and behaves.
Pre-conscious or unconscious factors may constitute intrapsy-
chic conflicts or dilemmas, wishes, expectations, fantasies, or
structural psychic functions (super-ego, ego and id, self- and
object-representations, capacities to regulate affects, impulses,
self-esteem, relationships with others etc.).
Consequently, a basic psychoanalytic approach to enable a
therapeutic process is to generate and foster a patient’s insight
into and understanding of these pre-conscious or unconscious
aspects and parts of him- or herself. This is to make conscious
what had been unconscious before, which is part of what Freud
(1933) wrote: “Where id was, there shall ego be.” A fundamen-
tal psychoanalytic technique during sessions is to ask patients to
report about “what comes into their heads, even if they think it is
unimportant, irrelevant, or non-sensical” (Strachey, 1953), which
was called by Freud “free association.” Another approach is the
patient’s report of dreams and the associations to them.
On the psychoanalysts’ part, the correspondent technical
approach is a special form of listening (“evenly suspended atten-
tion”), the use of clarification and interpretation and the for-
mulation of hypotheses on how the patient functions mentally
to establish links to unconscious conflicts and aspects; some-
thing the patient cannot perceive on his/her own and/or accept as
being connected with his/her conscious thinking and current-day
functioning. However, against the patient’s free association, the
building of links with unconscious aspects and gaining insight in
oneself, resistances and transference come into play—which both
can build the grounds for interpretations of the analyst. The psy-
choanalytic approach aims at enabling the patient to “remember,
repeat, and work through” (Freud, 1914) what has been experi-
enced in the past, repressed, or internalized. Interpretation and
insight may be the start of a reorganization of thoughts—the
former pre-conscious may become conscious.
Psychoanalysis focuses on childhood experiences and rela-
tions with significant others (mother, father, siblings etc.). These
relations had and still have an impact on a person’s life. It is
expressed in current relationships of the patient in the here-
and-now with important persons or the analyst. Beutel (2009)
summarizes effects that early childhood interpersonal experiences
have on cerebral development through genetic expression and the
development of neural connections.
Freud conceived the transference of the patient (so did his
followers regarding the countertransference of the analyst) as
obstacles to the therapy process. The adapted concepts were
the start of developing the second basic approach in psy-
choanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy: the focus is on
what is happening in the therapeutic relationship on the basis
of transference and countertransference. Dysfunctional, mal-
adaptive relationship patterns, fears, and wishes of the patient
tend to be repeated in the relation to the analyst. The rela-
tion toward the analyst (and the analyst itself) constitutes the
groundwork for the patient’s internal structure of expecta-
tions in relationships. The analytic setting fosters the evolution
of these inner conceptions. Within the transference situation,
unconscious processes can be actualized. Experiencing a secure
attachment with the analyst the patient may be enabled to
become aware and reconstruct his/her memories and relation-
ships (that may have structured him/her) and eventually work
them through.
Andrade (2005) stresses the effect of positive transference as
the basis of therapeutic action. The relationship between patient
and analyst promotes an identification that is based upon intro-
jection (of a good object) and empathy and can construct a
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new affective organization. According to Andrade (2005), the
affective nucleus fosters cognitive development. On the other
hand, interpretation—as the classic method of psychoanalysis—
is related to explicit memory (as part of the cortex) only and does
not effectively deal with implicit memory (as part of subcorti-
cal areas). Andrade (2005) points out that implicit memory can
only be seen through repetitive transference (cf. Beutel, 2009).
These implicit memories are unconscious affective structures
that can be emptied of their quotas of affect through trans-
ference (Andrade, 2005). A new affective configuration can be
established.
The Boston Change Process Study Group (2007) depicts early
childhood memories (for example, attachment patterns within
the second year of life) as implicit relation knowledge. This inter-
nal configuration constitutes the intercourse with others, which
becomes evident in subsequent object relations. The Boston
Change Process Study Group (2007) defines the intrapsychic as
interpersonal experience that is implicitly incorporated. To link
therapeutic change with neuroscience Andrade (2005) deduces
that “inadequate object relations can lead to neurophysiolog-
ical changes and that adequate analytic relations lead to psy-
chic changes that correspond to neuronal changes” (p. 684). As
described before, introjection may be the neurochemical basis
of psychic change, since new neural circuits—as a result of
the secretion of neurotransmitters—develop. Also, Beutel (2009)
describes the neuronal plasticity that evolves after mechanisms
of learning and their repetition. In psychotherapy, these pro-
gressions take time and need affective involvement (Beutel,
2009).
Within a psychotherapeutic environment, Sterba (1934)
described the “therapeutic division of the ego” into an experienc-
ing and an observing ego. During psychoanalysis the patient’s ego
is at the same time remembering or working through and also
analyzing this process. The conscious, reasonable, non-neurotic
parts of the patient’s ego can be distinguished from the uncon-
scious, conflict-motivated, irrational portions of the ego (Sterba,
1934). This potential of the neo-cortex (analyzing subcortical
activities) may be linked to neurosciences in the way Andrade
(2005) explains the difference between unconscious implicit and
conscious explicit memories (cf. Beauregard, 2007).
Beutel and Huber (2008) state in their review that psy-
choanalysis has an effect on the brain and argue that the
division of psychological psychotherapy and biological psychia-
try regarding a patient’s treatment has become out-dated. The
authors stress that today the main theorem of psychoanaly-
sis (a major part of psychic activity remains unconscious) is
a convention in neuroscience. Within psychoanalysis, patients
learn to deal with their reactivation of patterns in their transfer-
ence. In this sense, the reconstruction of object-related, psychic
configurations resembles the therapeutic effect Andrade (2005)
explained.
From a neuroscientific perspective, the problem of showing
these effects within methodical borders remains a challenge for
the future. For instance, Zwiebel (2007) depicts the difficultness
to fully understand the functioning of the analyst. Analysts oscil-
late between so-called personal and technical poles when treating
their patients (Zwiebel, 2007). Thus, the therapeutic process can
be understood to be on a micro-psychological level that can
hardly be quantified (cf. Beutel and Huber, 2008).
TWO METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
How can the complexity of input variables be dealt with in
order to enable future brain imaging studies in psychodynamic
psychotherapy? The general aim of this paper is to discuss the
variables that need to be controlled and measured in studying the
neural effects of psychodynamic psychotherapy. We will discuss
the various variables and the methodological problems which
can be subsumed under two main headings, the design prob-
lem and the translation problem. The design problem addresses
the issue of how to account for functionally related variables
in an experimentally independent way. For instance, the activa-
tion tasks employed in brain imaging should somehow mirror
and simulate those functional processes that are assumed to
mediate the therapeutic effects of psychodynamic psychother-
apy. Experimentally however, we need to measure and account
for both variables in an independent way without any confusion
between them. The translation problem raises the question of
how to bridge the gaps between the different levels of the con-
cepts presupposed in such investigation. The gap between the
personal level of the therapist and the client on the one hand, and
the neural level of the brain on the other, needs to be bridged.
There is also a gap between the behavioral effects of psychody-
namic psychotherapy the therapist can observe and the subjective
effects the client himself experiences. Finally, the gap between the
psychodynamic level of the psychodynamic psychotherapy, the
psychological level of the activation task in brain imaging and the
neural level of the parameters to be measured needs to be bridged.
The development of bridges for the various gaps is crucial in
developing an experimentally sound design that allows for valid
and reliable measurement and interpretation of the data. We will
discuss both problems here, the design problem and the transla-
tion problem in their various facets which will be illustrated by a
specific example, the example of introjection (see below for exact
definition).
DESIGN PROBLEM
The design problem deals with the issue how to account for
functionally related variables in an experimentally independent
way. Relevant inputs that enter such study designs include the
psychotherapist, the client, the therapeutic relationship and the
investigator, i.e., the experimentator (See Figure 1 and Table 1).
This discussion of the relevant inputs will shed some light on
which and how their variables can be controlled and accounted
for in experimental design.
The psychotherapist as “input”
What does the psychotherapist put into psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy? First and foremost he puts in his own personality,
his cognitions, his affects, and ultimately his own life history. In
the further course of the interaction between the patient and the
therapist it is the psychotherapist’s perspective on the patient’s
thoughts, feelings, and behavior which essentially contributes to
the development of the therapeutic relationship. Recent research
demonstrated that the psychotherapist himself, as a personality
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FIGURE 1 | The design problem.
with all his/her affects, cannot remain abstinent in psychother-
apy as originally envisioned by Freud. If the patient experiences
the analyst as an “impenetrable object,” it can lead to serious
difficulties in the analytic process, e.g., the patient will transfer
his/her projections onto the therapist, which in turn can trig-
ger unconscious “hardening” by the therapist (Skogstad, 2013).
Kohut (1959) pointed out that the capacity to show empathy
is a major factor in how the relationship between therapist and
client can develop which in turn has a strong impact on poten-
tial therapeutic effects. A recent study investigated cognitive and
emotional aspects of empathy in psychotherapists (Hassenstab
et al., 2007). When compared to control subjects, psychother-
apists showed higher empathy scores when making inferences
based on language mirroring cognitive aspects. Affective aspects
of empathy did not differ between both groups though psy-
chotherapists showed better emotion regulation with less per-
sonal distress in response to the distress of others. Though
preliminary because of the low number of cases (n = 19), this
psychological study supports the crucial importance of empathy
in psychotherapists. Certainly though further studies are neces-
sary to reveal the exact role of empathy and its distinct aspects
(sensory, cognitive, affective; see also Zanocco et al., 2006) in
psychotherapeutic interaction. Furthermore, one may investigate
whether the neural network implicated in empathy (insula, ante-
rior cingulate, thalamus, temporoparietal junction, amygdala;
see Frewen et al., 2008) may show a higher neuronal reactivity
in psychotherapists when compared to non-psychotherapists.
Ideally, one would include neuronal and psychophysiological
(skin conductance, heart rate, etc., see Marci and Riess, 2005)
measures of the psychotherapist’s emphatic abilities as confound-
ing variables, i.e., as regressor or co-variate, in the measurement
and analyses of the client’s neuronal changes during psychody-
namic psychotherapy.
Why consider the personality and empathic abilities of the psy-
chotherapist as a confounding variable? Imagine, for instance,
a psychotherapist with strong tendencies to identify with the
patient. This, of course, enables the therapist to understand the
patient and also, a client who has great difficulty internalizing
significant others might well benefit from such an empathic psy-
chotherapist and a supportive approach. On the other hand,
however, it might hinder his empathic abilities and may also be
problematic when he encounters for instance a depressed client
who has internalized highly ambivalent object relationships. This
case might be problematic for therapeutic interaction (e.g., when
the transference is directed by these ambivalent aspects of the
patient’s internalized relationships). Sandler et al. (2011) also
points out that for a successful psychotherapy beyond the actual
transference relationship, which enables the transference neuro-
sis; a different form of relationship—a “working alliance”—is
required. This should also enable the patient to maintain an
analytic attitude even if the transference conflicts are intense.
Psychotherapeutic effects might thus not only depend on the
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Table 1 | Input, empirical variables, and experimental measures.
Input Empirical variables Experimental measures
Psychotherapist Personality, empathy Scales for personality and empathy
Psychotherapeutic intervention as input Psychotherapeutic identity
Psychotherapeutic output Psychodynamic, subjective, and behavioral measures
Psychodynamic process mediating between
psycho-therapeutic input and output
Measurement of psychodynamic process with STIPO, OPD,
etc.
Attachment style Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), Adult Attachment
Prototype Rating (AAPR), etc.
Client/Patient Personality and psychodynamic structure as
input
Measurement of psychodynamic process with STIPO, OPD,
etc.
Behavioral and subjective input in the gestalt
of symptoms
Likert scales, reaction times, and other behavioral
parameters
Therapeutically-induced changes in subjective
and behavioral output
Psychophysiological measures like skin conductance, etc.
Attachment style Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), Adult Attachment
Prototype Rating (AAPR), etc.
Patient-psychotherapist-match Quality of therapeutic relationship Scales for measurement of fit of match between client and
therapist and thus of therapeutic relationship with Helping
Alliance Questionnaire (HAQ), Vanderbilt Psychotherapy
Process Scale, Working Alliance Inventory
Investigator Concept and hypothesis of brain function Localization vs. integration
Behavioral task as activation paradigm and
input
Neurophysiological, methodolo-gical, psychodynamic,
symptom-matic, and experiential demands
Changes in neuronal activity as output Method of measurement (fMRI, PET, etc.)
personality and psychic structures of the psychotherapist him-
self but also on the specific constellation between therapist and
client including their respective attachment styles (see for instance
Schauenburg et al., 2006). This makes it clear that experimen-
tally we do not only need to include personality scales for
both the client and the therapist but measures for attachment
styles on both sides, e.g., the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI;
Hesse, 1999) or the Adult Attachment Prototype Rating (AAPR;
Straußet al., 1999).
Another variable the psychotherapist himself puts in are of
course the psychotherapeutic interventions he uses to induce psy-
chotherapeutic change; the factor accounting for the psychothera-
peutic intervention may be conceptualized as “psychotherapeutic
input” which describes the intervention the psychotherapist uses
to induce therapeutic change in the client. Freud (1937) tackles
the desired changes in psychotherapy and appropriate therapeu-
tic interventions, when he raises the question of the “natural end
of the analysis.” He emphasizes that therapeutic interventions
should be aimed at overcoming the patient’s inner resistances, and
thus the symptoms he is suffering fromwill disappear. It is a ques-
tion of undoing “ego-changes,” which are created by mobilizing
ego-defenses against dangerously experienced drive-derivative in
the course of development. This makes up the analytical process.
The therapist may, for instance, maintain a state of analytic absti-
nence together with an evenly suspended attention as a basis for
interpreting unconscious conflicts, the transference or dreams. Or
he may choose to focus on working with imagination letting the
client imagine various kinds of scenarios to put traumatic events
into a broader context. Contrary to long-term psychoanalytical
psychotherapy, the therapist may focus—within the framework
of short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy—on so-called core
conflictual relationship themes (CCRT) or interpersonal con-
flicts in the actual relationship of the patient (Luborsky et al.,
1985; Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1989; Roth and Fonagy,
1996). This must be accounted for in a quantified and objective
way as for instance by the recently developed questionnaire of
psychotherapeutic identity that asks for various issues of the psy-
chotherapists’ education, experience, style, and values (see Klug
et al., 2004).
In addition to psychotherapeutic input and psychodynamic
process, we also need to account for the psychotherapeutic
output, the effects. There have been various studies show-
ing the therapeutic efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy
(see for instance Leichsenring and Leibing, 2007; Haase et al.,
2008; Leichsenring and Rabung, 2008; Taylor, 2008). Recently
developed instruments like the Operationalized Psychodynamic
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Diagnosis (OPD-2; Cierpka et al., 2007; Boeker and Richter, 2008;
Boeker et al., 2008; OPD-Task Force, 2008) enable an operational-
ized psychodynamic diagnostic approach based on a multiaxial
system (consisting of four psychodynamic axes and one descrip-
tive axis). Furthermore, OPD enables the definition of relevant
therapeutic foci and the measurement of therapeutic changes
(Rudolf et al., 2004). The Structured Interview for Personality
Organization (STIPO; Clarkin et al., 2004) was developed accord-
ing to the psychodynamic concept of Kernberg (1996). The
STIPO allows the evaluation of an individual’s personality orga-
nization with respect to the following dimensions: identity con-
solidation, quality of object relations, use of primitive defenses,
quality of aggression, adaptive coping vs. character rigidity, and
moral values. The psychotherapeutic output is accounted here
only on a psychodynamic level; this is problematic because the
measure that measures something, the psychotherapeutic output,
should be different from what it shall measure, the independent
variable in the experimental design (which though remains con-
stitutively dependent on it). Therefore, what is needed addition-
ally are some dependent variables of psychotherapeutic change
and their underlying psychodynamic processes on a different
level, the subjective and behavioral level.
One might argue that the neural effects themselves may well-
serve as dependent though different measure of psychothera-
peutic outcome. This however is to confuse different evidences.
The neural effects are supposed to evidence the effects of psy-
chotherapy on the neural level while they are not supposed to
reflect evidence of the psychotherapeutic effects by themselves.
We cannot measure and evidence psychotherapeutic effects by
neural measures, that are supposed to mediate them if we want
to avoid circularity. Hence, to reliably link neural effects to psy-
chotherapeutic effects, we need a measure of psychotherapeutic
effects that is neither psychodynamic, thereby avoiding identity
with the output, nor neural in order to avoid identity with the
process that is supposed to mediate its effects. As such a measure
Beutel (2009) suggests changes in the known memory systems—
declarative (explicit) and procedural (implicit)—, that (memory)
in turn can be localized in specific brain structures. He discussed
that the repression which has been overcome by analytic inter-
ventions, can lead to the repressed being recalled and then being
reproduced and detected by memory tests. The findings of Nader
et al. (2000) confirm the well-known fact in memory research
that memory performance is affected by the constellations of
encoding and retrieval situations and may distort the memory of
content (“false memory,” Loftus and Ketcham, 1994). In contrast
to these findings, we assume that the influence of the memory is
insignificant in the constellation of the encoding and the retrieval
situation, because it retrieves meaningful biographical informa-
tion. Thus, memory systems can on the one hand reflect the
effects of psychotherapy; on the other hand they can be localized
in specific areas of the brain itself. However, this requires a care-
ful conceptualization of such experiments: first, the confounding
variables should be detected (e.g., influencing memory perfor-
mance by the current emotional state of the patient/subject) and
controlled, and secondly a careful selection of test instruments
should be made. Only then can the memory performance be a
measure that maps evidence of the effects of psychotherapy on
the one hand, and locates and maps the neural level on the other
hand.
The client as “input”
First and foremost, the client comes with a specific psy-
chodynamic constellation and his particular personality, his
psychodynamic and personality input. For instance, a certain
mechanism may predominate to such a degree that it becomes
pathological [e.g., introjection in the “introjective type” of
depressed patients (see Blatt, 1974; Boeker et al., 2000; Taylor
and Richardson, 2005)]. Consequently, more mature mecha-
nisms cannot be used. The psychodynamic constellation of the
client needs to be objectified and verified and several instru-
ments like the OPD-2, the STIPO, and the KAPP (Weinryb
et al., 1991a,b) have been developed for this purpose. These
three are rating instruments based on psychoanalytical theory
to assess relatively stable modes of mental functioning as they
appear in self-perception of the own personality and interper-
sonal relations. In addition, one should also include measures
of the personality like the Temperament Character Inventory
(TCI) that measures various dimensions of reward (reward
dependence, novelty seeking, etc.) and self (self-directedness,
self-transcendence, etc.).
One possible confounding factor in experimental neuro-
imaging studies of patients in psychodynamic psychotherapy
could be a potentially conflicting situation of the “patients” being
at the same time the “subjects” in the neuro-imaging study, as
their willingness to participate in the study can be seen under the
point of view of their transference situation.
However, the client does not come to the psychotherapist
because of his specific psychodynamic constellation. He comes
because he encounters some behavioral and subjective problems
which outside observers may call symptoms. These symptoms
are the aim and targets of the psychotherapeutic intervention.
For instance, a client with high degree of introjection does not
come because of his abnormally high introjection but because he
may be severely depressed and it is his depressive symptoms that
are the target of psychotherapeutic intervention. What we need
to account for experimentally is thus the behavioral and sub-
jective problems encountered by the client, i.e., his symptoms.
They may for instance be measured subjectively with scales like
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996) or the
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) where the client himself rates and
evaluates his subjective and behavioral problems. Or the client’s
problems may be rated objectively by somebody else using for
instance the Hamilton Depression Rating scale (HDRS). In order
to avoid confusion between psychotherapeutic intervention and
symptom measurement, objective scales shall be accounted by a
person that is different and independent of the psychotherapist
himself since otherwise some bias and contamination by the latter
cannot be excluded. Most importantly, what is needed here in the
future is a clear empirical linkage between specific psychodynamic
processes and particular symptoms, i.e., behavioral and subjective
abnormalities. For instance, introjection or anaclitic needs have
often been associated with depression (see Blatt, 1974). Referring
to the psychotherapeutic context of introjection, Blatt’s distinc-
tion between introjective and anaclitic depression is of special
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importance. Patients suffering from anaclitic depression are pri-
marily preoccupied with issues of interpersonal relatedness (e.g.,
trust, caring, intimacy, and sexuality) and use primarily avoidant
defenses (e.g., denial and repression) to cope with psychological
conflict and stress. In contrast, patients suffering from introjec-
tive depression are primarily concerned with establishing and
maintaining a viable sense of self, ranging from a basic sense of
despair, to concerns about autonomy and control, to issues of self-
worth, and use primarily counteractive defenses (e.g., projection,
doing and undoing, intellectualization, reaction formation, and
over-compensation). Interestingly, this differentiation is signifi-
cantly related to different kinds of outcome in long-term inten-
sive treatment of seriously disturbed young adults, and different
responses to two forms of therapy—psychoanalysis and psy-
chotherapy (cf. Blatt, 1993). What is needed are studies to show
the correlation between both psychodynamic and symptomatic
measures entailing what we call psychodynamic-symptomatic
specificity.
Finally, we need to account for the change in the client as
induced by the psychotherapy. These changes may be measured
in behavioral and psychodynamic terms as discussed above and
should also be accounted for in subjective terms. For instance,
one hypothesis is that introjection may be accounted for by
what we call self-related processing (Boeker and Richter, 2008;
Northoff, 2008). If so one would expect increased self-relatedness
in depressed patients when compared to healthy subjects which
is indeed the case as demonstrated recently (Northoff, 2007;
Grimm et al., 2009). Psychodynamic psychotherapy should lead
to a decrease in the self-focus in depressed patients which ide-
ally should be accompanied by decreased introjection. If so,
the subjective experience of self-relatedness may be taken as a
marker of subjective change induced by psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy. This may be accompanied ideally by behavioral
markers like reaction time measures during tasks implicating
self-relatedness. Most importantly, the subjective and behav-
ioral measure of self-relatedness should be sensitive to both,
the psychodynamic processes as induced by psychotherapeu-
tic intervention, and the symptoms, i.e., the clients’ behavioral
and subjective input. This means that self-relatedness should
serve as dependent variable of both introjection and depressed
symptoms and that the latter two should also be linked in
functional regard. All three, self-relatedness, introjection, and
depressed symptoms are thus closely linked to each other in
functional and hence constitutional regard while experimentally
they should be kept distinct and separate. We are thus again
confronted with the discrepancy between clinical and experi-
mental levels encountering the constitution of clinical symptoms
by various interdependent functions which though experimen-
tally need to be kept apart and thus independent of each
other.
The therapeutic relationship as input
Over the past decades the psychoanalytical situation was re-
conceptualized as a dyadic system in which the psychoanalytic
psychotherapist is both participant and observer. The broad-
ened definition of counter-transference and the influence of
object relations theory and various intersubjective perspectives
have led to increased emphasis on the relationship between
psychotherapist and patient. Many new terms have been coined
to emphasize various facets of the “two-personness” of analysis
including the therapeutic alliance and the “real” relationship (cf.
Vaughan and Roose, 2000). Themost far-reaching attempt to dis-
tinguish transference-countertransference from “reality” aspects
of the dyad has occurred in the context of the growing emphasis
on patient-therapist match.
Kantrowitz et al. (1989) defined match in the following way:
match is “a broader field of phenomena in which counter-
transference is included as one of many types of match.
The individual history, characteristics, attitudes, and values of
each analyst and patient predispose them respectively to cer-
tain counter-transference and transference reactions. Match,
however, can also refer to observable styles, attitudes, and
personal characteristics which are rooted in residual and unan-
alyzed conflicts, shared or triggered in any patient-analyst
pair” (Kantrowitz et al., 1989, p. 895). Different types of
facilitating and impeding matches are distinguished from one
another which based on similarity and complementarity very
much resemble the concordant and complementary transference-
countertransference paradigms delineated by Racker (1968)
within an object relations model. The importance of interac-
tive, non-verbal affective communication that shapes the behav-
ior and response of the patient and the therapist also needs
to be pointed out as one central factor constituting the match
(cf. Kantrowitz, 1995).
Some psychotherapy studies have focused on the question of
what constitutes a good match. Luborsky et al. (1988) observed
that from ten pre-treatment demographic variables (age, mari-
tal status, having children, religion and level of religious activity,
education, cognitive style, etc.) only match in marital status
was found to be significantly predictive of positive outcome
(see Garfield and Bergin, 1978; Gruenbaum, 1983; Hollander-
Goldfein et al., 1989, for other studies in this direction).
Recently, instruments to measure the fit or match between
therapist and client have been developed. The Helping Alliance
Questionnaire (Luborsky, 1984) investigates the subjective eval-
uation of the therapeutic relationship from the perspective
of both the client and the therapist so that the correla-
tion between both may reflect the fit or “match.” Another
instrument is the Vanderbilt Psychotherapy Process Scale
(O’Malley et al., 1983) that allows an evaluation of the
client-therapist relationship by means of an external observer
as for instance a video recording. It includes dimensions
like patient involvement, therapist-offered relationship and
exploratory process. Finally, the Working Alliance Inventory
(Horvath and Greenberg, 1989; see also Bordin, 1975, 1976)
includes 36 items to the dimensions goal, task and bond that
can be evaluated by the client, the therapist, and an external
observer.
Taken together, there is still a need for psychotherapeutic
research that collects data from both participants in dyadic sit-
uations. To date there are only very few studies attempting to
operationalize different factors of the therapeutic relationship and
developing adequate paradigms using neuro-imaging approaches
(see Kaechele and Buchheim, 2008).
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The investigator as input
The investigator targets the brain; more specifically he aims to
reveal the neural effects of psychodynamic psychotherapy. By
developing his hypothesis about possible neural effects, he must
presuppose (either implicitly or explicitly) a specific concept
and theory of brain function. For instance, presupposing strict
localizationism and modularity, he may hypothesize that neural
activity in a specific region like the often observed abnormality
in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (Mayberg, 2003) may
be changed and normalized by psychodynamic psychotherapeutic
intervention in depression. This hypothesis is based upon similar
observations in CBT and pharmacotherapy (see Goldapple et al.,
2004; Kennedy et al., 2007). However, these and almost any other
brain imaging study on the neural effects of psychotherapy do
show a wide variety of different regions showing neural changes.
This puts the presupposition of strict localization into doubt and
may make a different concept and theory of brain function.
Alternatively to localizationism, one may assume neuronal
integration. Neuronal integration describes the coordination and
adjustment of neuronal activity across multiple brain regions.
The interaction between distant and remote brain areas is consid-
ered necessary for a complex function to occur, such as emotion
or cognition (Price and Friston, 2002; Friston, 2003). Neuronal
integration focusing on the interaction between two or more
brain regions must be distinguished from neuronal segregation
(Price and Friston, 2002; Friston, 2003). Here a particular cogni-
tive or emotional function or processing capacity is ascribed to
neural activity in a single area that is both necessary and suf-
ficient; one can subsequently speak of neuronal specialization
and localization. We assume that for instance mechanisms as
complex emotional-cognitive interactions cannot be localized in
specialized or segregated brain regions. Instead, we consider spe-
cific psychodynamic mechanisms to require interaction between
different brain regions and thus neuronal integration
For neuronal integration to be possible, distant and remote
brain regions have to be linked together which is provided by
connectivity. Connectivity describes the relation between neural
activity in different brain areas. There is anatomical connectiv-
ity for which we will use the term connections in order to clearly
distinguish it from functional connectivity. In addition, Friston
and Price (2001) distinguish between functional and effective
connectivity: functional connectivity describes the “correlation
between remote neurophysiological events” which might be due
to either direct interaction between the events or other factors
mediating both events. A correlation can either indicate a direct
influence of one brain area on another or their indirect link-
age via other factors. In the first case the correlation is due to
the interaction itself whereas in the second the correlation might
be due to other rather indirect factors like for example stim-
uli based on common inputs. In contrast, effective connectivity
describes the direct interaction between brain areas, it “refers
explicitly to the (direct) influence that one neural system exerts
over another, either at a synaptic or population level” (Friston
and Price, 2001). Here, effective connectivity is considered on the
population level because this corresponds best to the level of dif-
ferent brain regions investigated here. For example, the prefrontal
cortex might modulate its effective connectivity with subcortical
regions thereby influencing specific functions like interoceptive
processing.
Based upon connectivity, neural activity between distant and
remote brain regions has to be adjusted, coordinated, and har-
monized. Coordination and adjustment of neural activity might
not be arbitrarily but guided by certain principles of neuronal
integration (Northoff et al., 2004). These principles describe
functional mechanisms according to which the neural activ-
ity between remote and distant brain regions is organized and
coordinated. Such principles of neuronal integration might for
instance include reciprocal modulation, modulation by func-
tional unity, top-down modulation, and modulation by reversal
(see Boeker et al., 2006; Northoff, 2008, for details). As hypoth-
esized by us, each of these principles may be associated with a
specific psychodynamic mechanism.
One may want to argue that the debate about the presup-
posed theory and concept of brain function is of mere theoretical
interest while remaining empirically irrelevant. This however is to
neglect that the experimental measure of neural change strongly
depend upon the concepts we as investigator put into the inves-
tigation itself. If we, for instance, hypothesize a single or specific
regions to be effected by psychodynamic psychotherapy, we only
measure and analyze our data with regard to such localizationism.
While we neither measure nor analyze brain function in orienta-
tion on for instance the above mentioned principles of neuronal
integration that require differentmethods of analysis. Thismay be
necessary in depression where the specific abnormality may not
consist in one particular region but an abnormal reciprocal mod-
ulation between medial and lateral prefrontal cortex with both
regions no longer activating in a converse, i.e., opposite and recip-
rocal way (see Northoff et al., 2004; Boeker et al., 2006; Grimm
et al., 2006). Hence, by concentrating on changes in single regions,
we may miss neural changes that are induced by psychothera-
peutic effects like the normalization of for instance reciprocal
modulation between medial and lateral prefrontal cortex. This
demonstrates that the very concept of brain the investigator
himself most often implicitly presupposes may strongly impact
what and how he measures brain function and which neuronal
variables can and will be linked to psychotherapeutic change.
Another crucial input by the investigator is the behavioral
task he employs in brain imaging to induce changes in neu-
ronal activity. Brain imaging may be performed in resting state
and or during an activation state with the latter requiring a
specific behavioral task. The choice and selection of this behav-
ioral task is of vital importance. Functionally, the behavioral
task should be linked to the psychodynamic processes targeted
by the psychotherapist in psychodynamic psychotherapy as well
as to the client’s symptoms, his subjective and behavioral com-
plaints. Psychotherapeutic intervention may then be assumed
to contribute to “normalize” abnormal reciprocal modulation
in depression. This implies for the experimental designs that
the behavioral task used in scanning should recruit those neu-
ral processes and mechanisms that supposedly mediate both the
psychodynamic interventions and the client’s symptoms. In addi-
tion to such psychodynamic and symptomatic requirements, the
behavioral task needs to meet experimental demands. Such exper-
imental demands include careful control conditions, behavioral
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and subjective measurement of the effects of the task itself, empir-
ical linkage to the targeted neural processes and mechanisms,
etc. The main problem here is to reconcile psychodynamic and
symptomatic requirements with experimental demands. The unit
of interest on both the psychodynamic and symptomatic level
includes usually a mixture of several psychological, subjective,
and behavioral variables which though on the experimental level
need to be carefully controlled and spaced apart. Since the devel-
opment of the behavioral task, the activation paradigm, is vital,
we will discuss this issue in more detail in the next section.
TRANSLATION PROBLEM
The above description of the design problem in its various facets
reveals that different levels of investigation are involved. The
translation problem deals with the methods and strategy how
we can bridge the gap between the different levels. To simplify
things, we want to discuss in the following four examples with
each showing one pair of different levels. We will contrast per-
sonal and neuronal levels, psychodynamic and processual levels,
and first- vs. third-person levels (see Figure 2).
Personal and neuronal levels: persons vs. brains
The psychotherapist and the client are individual subjects and
must therefore be characterized as persons. The brain, in contrast,
is not a person but rather an object. Though this seems obvi-
ous it has major implications in both conceptual and empirical
regard. Let us consider first the conceptual implications. Bennett
and Hacker (2003) warn not to confuse individual subjects with
their brains because that means to neglect the basic difference
between persons and objects; they speak of what they call mereo-
logical fallacy where the whole, i.e., the person, is confused with
one of its parts, the brain. This means for instance that one can-
not say that the brain thinks, feels, or acts since these attributes
belong only to persons.
What is treated in psychodynamic psychotherapy is not
the brain but the person. We may treat the person in a
neurophysiologically-constrained way by considering neural
Personal 
Neural 
Psychodynamic 
Processual 
First-Person 
Third-Person 
Brain: Neural organization 
FIGURE 2 | Different levels and the translation problem.
processes and mechanisms in our psychotherapeutic interven-
tions but this concerns only the neural processes that suppos-
edly mediate the therapeutic outcome. Thus, to argue that we
treat the client’s brain rather than himself as person is not
only to confuse person and brain but also to neglect the dif-
ference between neural processes/mechanisms and psychother-
apeutic output. Neural processes and mechanisms concern the
brain and may be regarded a necessary though not sufficient
condition of psychotherapeutic output since other factors like
interpersonal constellations, the cultural environment etc., have
to be considered too.
The psychotherapeutic output, in contrast, concerns the level
of the person that of course is somehow related to the brain but
should at least conceptually not be identified with it. Hence, psy-
chodynamic psychotherapy targets the person rather than the
brain though its effects may, at least in part, be mediated neu-
rally and thus by the brain. This implies that we should not aim
to map the psychodynamic concepts in a one-to-one way with
neural activity in particular brain regions or networks and thus to
strive for what is described by the concept of “neural correlates.”
This is so because that would mean to neglect the various other
factors or variables that are implied and included in psychody-
namic concepts as we saw in the specific case of psychotherapeutic
intervention. Instead of the concept of neural correlates one may
therefore want to preferably use the concept of “neural mecha-
nisms” that, unlike the concept of neural correlates, does not pre-
suppose one-to-one mapping between psychodynamic concepts
and neural activity. As such neural mechanisms are supposed
to underlie (rather than correlate with) psychodynamic concepts
and thus psychotherapeutic interventions which leaves open con-
ceptual and empirical space for including variables other than
purely neural ones.
Personal and neuronal levels: generality vs. individuality
Another important empirical implication of the conceptual dif-
ference between persons and objects is the difference between
individual and general levels. Persons concern individual subjects
each with major idiosyncrasies both psychodynamically and neu-
rally. The focus of psychodynamic psychotherapy is always on the
individual, its specific subjective and personal contents as derived
from its life history. Psychoanalysis gives us a conceptual frame-
work to link these individual contents, as they are experienced
from the inside of the experiencing person itself, to general struc-
tures of the psyche of persons, as they are observed from the
outside by the observer. Neuroscience, in contrasts, concerns the
brain as we can observe it from the outside; thereby however
the individual person’s specifics get lost because the experimen-
tal approach averages across different individual subjects. The
difference between individuality and generality marks a princi-
pal difference between psychoanalysis and neuroscience which
is nicely expressed by David Milrod (2002, pp. 22–23) in the
following quote: “Neuroscientists strive to explain fundamental
phenomena such as perception, consciousness, emotion, mem-
ory, etc., including the subtleties of their integration, and in this
way build up an understanding of the basic functioning of the
organism. In recent years they have included a study of the self
as it integrates with consciousness, emotion, and awareness of
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the object . . . In short, they concern themselves with the univer-
sal and objective. Psychoanalysis, which has historically focused
on the individual and has been more interested in ontology, has
as its goal the understanding of protracted intrapsychic, interper-
sonal, and subjective functioning of the individual. It was in order
to better understand that functioning that psychoanalysts had to
deal with the self and its representation. In dealing with the self,
the psychoanalyst is more likely to focus on the contents of the self
and its representation, the state of stability or fragility it may pos-
sess . . . In other words, they focus on those elements that make
each individual different from one another.”
How can we bridge the principal difference between the indi-
vidual level of persons and the general level of brains? One way
is to investigate only single cases and to focus on case studies
(see for instance Solms and Lechevalier (2002) with regard to
lesions patients as well as Overbeck et al., 2004; Rudolf et al.,
2004; Lai et al., 2007; Lehto et al., 2008, for single case studies of
psychodynamic psychotherapy and brain imaging). This however
precludes a deeper insight into the neural processes and mech-
anisms that may eventually mediate psychotherapeutic output.
What we need to develop are experimental designs and analy-
ses that allow to take the individualized data as starting point
and then to take and preserve these individual features as start-
ing point for group analyses without averaging and generalizing
them out into a group mean.
One may for instance imagine that the regions of interest in
the individual subjects are taken as starting point for averaging
and group analysis. The individual regions of interest may not
only be determined and oriented on anatomical constraints but
also psychodynamic constraints like the predominance of a cer-
tain psychodynamic mechanism. Another possibility is to group
the individual subjects according to their subjective or psychody-
namic profiles as revealed in empirical investigation of subjective
experience. For instance, subjects with “high scores of introjec-
tion” may then be grouped together and compared with those
showing “low scores of introjection.” One of the major method-
ological challenges in the future is thus to develop experimental
designs and ways of analyses that allow to link individual and gen-
eral features on the neural level in the same way Freud achieved it
on the psychological level in such an ingenious way.
Personal and neuronal levels: content vs. organization
Another issue in this regard is the difference between neural
contents and neural organization. Psychodynamic concepts may
mirror the general organization of psychological activity which
then may be manifest and realized in specific psychological con-
tents of that individual person. This parallels to the neural level.
We mentioned above that one may search for principles of neu-
ral integration rather than specific regions and networks. Specific
regions and networks mirror what may be called neural contents
and these are the targets in for instance the search for the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC) presupposing mere correla-
tion and one-to-one mapping strategies. The principles of neural
integration refer rather to the organization of neural activity and
hence to what we call neural organization.
If one now searches for psychodynamic concepts in specific
neural regions and networks, one may attempt to link structures
of psychological organization with neural contents. This how-
ever may be doomed to fail because one then confuses the level
of organization, as presupposed on the psychological level, with
the level of contents, as implied by the neural level, with both
remaining unable to match or correspond on a one-to-one basis.
Instead, one may rather link psychodynamic concepts to the neu-
ral organization with both presupposing and implying analogous
structures. This however remains rather speculative at this point
(see Northoff, 2011, for a first attempt in this sense with regard
to the self) since especially the principles and structures of neural
organization, as distinguished from neural contents, remain to be
explored.
Psychodynamic level vs. process level
One of the main issues is the translation of psychodynamic con-
cepts into processes that then can be psychologically and neurally
investigated. Consider again the example of introjection as a
psychodynamic mechanism.
Introjection is considered a psychodynamic mechanism that,
based on Mentzos (1995), can generally be determined as a form
of appropriating and relating objects to the subjects in a personal
way that is called internalization. Internalization includes three
different mechanisms, identification, introjection and incorpo-
ration. These mechanisms of identification depend on different
structural levels of the ego functions and of the personality.
Incorporation describes that the subjects incorporates and inte-
grates objects into itself so that the object becomes part of the
subject itself with the former being indistinguishable from the
latter. The subject may also introject the object.
What distinguishes introjection from identification and incor-
poration (cf. Meissner, 1978)? The separate reality of the object
is acknowledged by the subject in introjection but the object
relations are highly ambivalent including aggressive and narcis-
sistic conflicts and feelings of anxiety, which are defended by
projective mechanisms. In contrast, identifications depend on
differentiated, continuous object relations and enable a selec-
tive internalization of partial aspects of the object. Ambivalent
emotions may be tolerated and expressed. Incorporations, intro-
jections, and identifications are important steps and components
of the maturation process. Disturbances of the maturation pro-
cess may lead—in a psychological developmental and psychoan-
alytical perspective—to the development of pathological defense
mechanisms and the reactivation of early modes of internaliza-
tion and object relationships (e.g., introjection in depression and
Borderline, see Boeker et al., 2006).
Introjection allows the distinction between subject and object
by the subject; however the price for acknowledging their dif-
ference consists in ambivalence with subsequent affects and
anxieties. Metaphorically speaking, the object becomes strongly
affectively colored by the subject while at the same time retain-
ing its separate reality and reality for the subject. By means of
affective involvement, the object is thus subjectified and related to
the subject or, as one could say with Mentzos (1995), something
objective(-object) is transformed into something subjective(-
object): the parenthesis are included because the object becomes
only colored by subjectivity while retaining its status as object
whereas in projection, as the opposite of introjection, one would
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 355 | 10
Boeker et al. Psychodynamic psychotherapy in individualized neuro-imaging
probably speak of objective-subject. The result of this process
of introjection may be what is called an introject, the internal
representation of an object. An object can be internalized and
introjected and thus become an introject only if it has a special
meaning and personal significance to the subject which usually
is reflected in strong emotional involvement with the respective
emotional feelings. If, for, instance, somebody has a rather close
but ambivalent and therefore a strongly emotionally loaded rela-
tionship to her/his mother, the mother as object may become
internalized and introjected to resolve the ambiguity in the rela-
tionship resulting in the mother being an introject for the subject.
If, in contrast, the relationship to the mother is positive and free
of ambiguity, it is possible to identify with the mother selectively
as well as being separated from her.
This short description of introjection points out some cardi-
nal psychological processes like relating objects to the person’s
self which has recently been described as self-related processing
(Northoff et al., 2006). Moreover, it is clear that emotion process-
ing is involved and closely linked to self-relatedness. Furthermore,
the ability to relate to other people that involves empathy is crucial
in introjection. At the same time however self-awareness is also
involved since otherwise the introjecting person remains unable
to distinguish itself as subject from the object, i.e., from other per-
sons. These psychological processes that then could be regarded
as starting point for developing a neuro-psychodynamic hypoth-
esis of introjection. Accordingly, a translation from the level of a
psychodynamic concept, i.e., introjection, to a process level, i.e.,
self-related and emotional processing etc., is needed to develop
neuro-psychodynamic hypotheses and appropriate experimen-
tal designs. The psychological processes that may eventually be
involved in psychodynamic concepts may then be used as guiding
thread for where to look in the brain and what kind of principles
of neural organization may be involved.
First-person level vs. third-person level
Systematic examination and evaluation of subjective experience
must preserve its richness and complexity on the one hand,
and objectively quantify its main characteristics on the other.
Objectification and quantification of subjective first-person data
allows for scientific investigation and consequently for establish-
ing what can be called a “science of experience” (Gabbard, 2000).
Based on a “science of experience,” a “science of psychodynamic
processes” needs to be developed. The “science of psychody-
namic processes” should place great emphasis on patients’ mental
life or inner experience in order to preserve the richness and
complexity of subjective experience and clinical description. At
the same time, these subjective features must be objectified to
provide reliable and quantifiable data. This can be achieved by
asking the subjects to complete rating scales. For example, visual
analog scales (Weinryb et al., 1991a,b) with regard to personal
identity or idiographic instruments like the Repertory Grid Test
(Boeker et al., 2000) which enables the evaluation of idiosyncratic
experiences and views by means of a semi-quantitative measure-
ment, might be applied to let the subjects themselves evaluate
their experiences. One might also apply structured interviews
with valid and reliable instruments for evaluation of the subjects’
relevant psychodynamic features by an experienced investigator.
General instruments include, for example, the Karolinska scale
that assesses different psychodynamically-relevant dimensions of
a person’s structure (Weinryb et al., 1991a,b). Another instru-
ment is the Operationalized Pychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD-2;
OPD-Task Force, 2008) which examines three psychodynamically
relevant axes interpersonal relations, conflict and psychic struc-
ture, an axis on the experience of the illness and prerequisites for
treatment and one descriptive axis (psychic and psychosomatic
disturbances according to ICD-10 and DSM-IV).
One of the main methodological challenges in investigating
the neuronal processes underlying mechanisms is to link these
first-person data about psychodynamic processes to third-person
observation of neural states. Being based upon subjective experi-
ence, psychoanalysis relies on first-person data or more precisely
on data obtained by introspection that presupposed what may
be called Second-Person Perspective (which in the following we
will subsume under the concept of First-Person Perspective). This
contrasts with neuroscience which requires third-person obser-
vation of neuronal states. Due to the neglect of first-person
subjective experience, neuronal states as third-person data can
be quantified and objectified. This, in contrast, remains impos-
sible in the case of first-person data which are rather qualitative
and subjective. If, however, the neuronal processes of mecha-
nisms are to be investigated, subjective experience and neuronal
states (i.e., first- and third-person data) have to be linked to each
other in a systematic way. For this purpose, we have created an
appropriate methodological strategy, First-Person Neuroscience,
which aims at systematically linking first- and third-person data
(see Northoff, 2007) that also conceptualizes many investigations
in current brain imaging that correlate subjective experiential
variables (as for instance in visual analogs scales) with neu-
ral measures of brain function (see for instance Grimm et al.,
2009).
We define “First-Person Neuroscience” as a methodological
strategy to systematically link first-person subjective experience
to third-person observation of neuronal states. The develop-
ment of such methods distinguishes First-Person Neuroscience
from neuroscience as it is commonly practiced which most often
relies on third-person observation of neuronal states more or
less independently of subjective experience. The main challenge
in establishing First-Person Neuroscience consists in linking the
individual contents of subjective experience to neuronal states.
How can we link subjective experience to neuronal states?
Linkage between subjective experience and neuronal states
requires two steps: first, subjective experience needs to be eval-
uated systematically including objectification and quantification
of subjective data. Such “science of experience” is a necessary
precondition for any linkage between subjective experience and
neuronal states. Second, the systematically objectified and quan-
tified subjective data then enable the linkage to analogous data
about neuronal states. For this, special methodological strategies
need to be developed—this is the core of what we call “First-
Person Neuroscience.” The above described discussion of how to
translate the psychodynamic concept of introjection, that exper-
imentally is accounted for by first-person data, into a behavioral
task as activation paradigm, that yields third-person data about
the brain, can be regarded as example of how to link first- and
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third-person perspectives and may therefore be regarded an
instance of First-Person Neuroscience.
INDIVIDUALIZED PARADIGMS IN NEURO-IMAGING: STATE
OF THE ART
EXISTING APPROACHES
Over the past years, a number of studies have employed neuro-
imaging methods in psychoanalytically oriented research. The
importance of individualized experiments in studying psy-
chotherapeutic changes, for instance, has been stressed by Kessler
et al. (2011b, 2012). Though neurobiological changes in some
(single) cases undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy have
been reported, mostly using Single-photon Emission Computed
Tomography (SPECT) (Viinamäki et al., 1998; Saarinen et al.,
2005; Lai et al., 2007; Lehto et al., 2008) with few using func-
tionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) in studies of obsessive
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and somatoform disorder
(Overbeck et al., 2004; Beutel et al., 2010; deGreck et al., 2011).
To date, studies examining the functional neuroanatomy of psy-
chotherapy in depressed patients involved IPT or CBT (Roffman
et al., 2005; Linden, 2006). Buchheim et al. (2012) were the first to
conduct an fMRI study with depressed patients treated with psy-
chodynamic psychotherapy using two fMRI paradigms (Kessler
et al., 2011a, 2012; Taubner et al., 2012). The first paradigm
was based on clinical material drawn from OPD-2 interviews.
Kessler et al. (2011a, 2012) confronted patients with themes of
their maladaptive interpersonal relationship patterns, presenting
them sentences in the scanner which were derived from an OPD
interview. They individually selected four sentences for each per-
son representing a core dysfunctional relationship theme. During
the control condition (traffic) patients recalled a stressful traffic
situation they had experienced inducing negative emotions and
recalling autobiographical memories. Conditions were separated
by a “relaxation” condition. The second paradigm, described by
Taubner et al. (2012), used attachment-related pictures from the
Adult Attachment Projective Picture System (AAP). They aimed
at eliciting mental engagement with attachment-related experi-
ences such as loss, illness, danger, and separation. During an AAP
interview patients described the scene in the picture including
what characters were thinking and what could happen next. From
this interview three sentences representing the attachment pattern
of each patient were extracted. As control condition participants
were shown the AAP pictures and were invited to only describe
the environment depicted.
Methodological shortcomings in these fMRI paradigms can
be discussed such as the elevated cognitive demand implied
by a reading task, unsatisfying control conditions and diffi-
culty concerning the selection of stimuli. These methodological
concerns are expression of the complex endeavor that the inves-
tigation of neural mechanisms of subjective experience implies
(Logothetis, 2008). Developing valid experimental designs tak-
ing into account the very individual dimension of experience is
an arduous methodological challenge, as it has been illustrated
here before. In the following section, our attempt to create a new
experimental design for the investigation of neural mechanisms
in depressed patients during psychodynamic psychotherapy will
be depicted.
Coherent with the above-described methodological strat-
egy named “First-Person-Neuroscience” the experimental design
aims at systematically linking subjective experience to the obser-
vation of neural states. This necessitates the objective evaluation
of subjective experience in a first step. In a second step, the so
created data has to be linked to observations on the neural level.
To begin with, we will outline our choices of how to evaluate
subjective experience, giving a brief description of the axis “inter-
personal relations” from the OPD-2 (OPD-Task Force, 2008) as
well as the Maladaptive Interpersonal Patterns Q-Sort (MIPQS;
Zimmermann et al., accepted). We will then describe the devel-
opment of the “Interpersonal Relations Picture Set” (IRPS) and a
new neuro-imaging experiment based on the IRPS.
THE OPD-2 AXIS “INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS” AND THE
MALADAPTIVE INTERPERSONAL PATTERNS Q-SORT (MIPQS)
An adapted instrument to attempt an objective evaluation of
subjective experience is the OPD-2 (OPD-Task Force, 2008). It
operationalizes psychodynamic dimensions in different diagnos-
tic axes. Regarding depressive disorders, the axis “interpersonal
relations” is particularly relevant, as depressive disorders go along
with various impairments in interpersonal and social function-
ing. For example, depressive patients tend to have deficits in
emotional expression and emotion recognition in others. They
also tend to have difficulties with affective modulation in basic
interpersonal communication of emotions and feelings. Broadly
speaking, psychodynamic psychotherapy sets a specific focus on
these affective processes using phenomena of transference and
countertransference. The axis “interpersonal relations” of the
OPD-2 offers a classificatory system describing different patterns
in interpersonal behavior. This diagnostic axis enables clinicians
to assess and precisely describe specific maladaptive interpersonal
patterns in patients with depression.
Recently, the Maladaptive Interpersonal Patterns Q-Sort
(MIPQS), a self-report version of the OPD-2 axis “interpersonal
relations,” has been developed (Zimmermann et al., accepted).
Using a card sorting procedure, the MIPQS allows the establish-
ment of a subjective and hierarchized profile of typical inter-
personal behavior. One of its substantial advantages compared
to the OPD interpersonal relation axis is the facility in its use.
The MIPQS exists in two versions. The MIPQS-A is a self-
evaluation of the participant concerning typical interpersonal
behavior. In contrast, the MIPQS-B enables the clinician to eval-
uate the participant’s interpersonal behavioral patterns from his
point of view and based on the interview situation. We will con-
centrate here on the MIPQS-A. The card sorting procedure of
the MIPQS-A (named MIPQS in the following) comprises two
steps. In a first step, the participant rates the relevance of behav-
ioral patterns (described by 32 items) in his own behavior toward
significant others. In a second step, the participant rates the rel-
evance of described behavioral patterns (equally 32 items) in
the behavior of others toward himself. The description of pat-
terns in interpersonal behavior was adopted from rating items
of the OPD interpersonal relation axis. These items are theoret-
ically close to interpersonal circumflex models such as used in
interpersonal psychology (e.g., the SASB/Structural Assessment
of Social Behaviormodel, Benjamin et al., 2006). The SASBmodel
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describes different qualities of interpersonal behavior by means
of two orthogonal and bipolar dimensions: control (dominant
vs. submissive) and affiliation (friendly vs. hostile). The MIPQS
items have been empirically tested and can be located in the cir-
cumplex model comprising these two dimensions. Every one of
the 32 MIPQS items consists of two easy to understand descrip-
tions of a specific interpersonal behavior pattern like “I tend to
ignore others or give them the cold shoulder” and respectively
“Others tend to ignore me or give me a cold shoulder.” They
are printed on separate cards. The sorting procedure includes
the depositing of the 32 cards on finally nine columns ranging
from “most typical” to “most untypical” with “unimportant” as
the fifth column. Furthermore, the instrument offers a sequen-
tial ranking of all items from 1 (most untypical) to 32 (most
typical).
Based on the items of the MIPQS we have developed graphic
illustrations forming the so-called “Interpersonal Relations
Picture Set” (IRPS), which we plan to use in fMRI experiments.
In the following the different steps of its development will be
described.
THE INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS PICTURE SET (IRPS)
The MIPQS provides 32 items describing patterns of
interpersonal behavior. The IRPS comprises pictures illus-
trating interpersonal behavior patterns. The pictures were
developed step-by-step. At first, there had been an attempt to
illustrate the interpersonal situations by means of multicolored
symbols. However, this approach was abandoned because of
the high level of abstraction of these symbols. Consecutively, a
collection of pictures illustrating the different situations bymeans
of stick figures was composed (see Figure 3A). The pen-drawings
were scanned for further processing in a widely used image
editor (Seashore©). Each picture shows two or more black stick
figures on white background. The figures vary in size, but do
not show any gender specification, facial expression, clothes,
or other specific characteristics. Some figures, e.g., the figure
taking a neutral body position, occur repeatedly in different
pictures. Different interpersonal situations are expressed only in
the specific posture of figures as well as their positions toward
each other.
FIGURE 3 | Example from the IRPS representing the item “I tend to
ignore others or give them the cold shoulder” (A) and an example of a
picture from the control condition (B) used in the fMRI-experiment.
Please note that style and number of the stick figures and the basic
characteristics of the pictures are matched across conditions. Subjects are
asked to take the interpersonal perspective of the figure indicated by the
gray marker.
VALIDATION OF THE PICTURES
Concerning the testing of these pictures, ethical approval, and
permission was obtained for all procedures described below from
the Ethics Committee at the University of Zurich. A complete and
detailed description of the study was provided to participants and
patients and they gave a written informed consent concerning
their participation.
In order to confirm the relation of every picture to the assigned
item of the MIPQS we performed an online survey. It was sent to
a mailing list of the university. The survey included an introduc-
tion, an instruction concerning the questionnaire and a request
of age, gender, educational level, and history of interpersonal
relationships. Then the ISPS pictures were presented in random-
ized order. Participants were asked to judge the pictures in two
conditions. Firstly, in the “discrimination task,” pictures were pre-
sented combined with the matching description as well as four
randomly selected descriptions out of the remaining 31 MIPQS
items. Furthermore, a response that none of the offered descrip-
tions fitted the picture was added. This form of questioning was
designed asmultiple choice task and only one answer was allowed.
Participants were asked to distinguish the matching description
from the offered choice. Secondly, in the “relevance task,” partic-
ipants were asked to rate the level of relevance of each picture.
A nine-point Likert scale was combined with the picture and
its matching description for this task. The sample of the online
survey was randomly split into two groups to avoid a repetition
effect. Hence, no itemwas presented twice in the survey. Statistical
analysis was conducted using the SPSS® software package (IBM).
The data for all variables collected were subjected to descrip-
tive statistics according to the respective scale level. In order to
assure direct interpretability of results of both tasks, the data anal-
ysis was limited to descriptive statistics. This included indicating
the proportion of correct responses for multiple choice tasks in
percentage and the median for nine-point Likert scales.
In a further step, we tested the correspondence between the
IRPS and the MIPQS when participants performed them sep-
arately. A number of patients suffering from Major Depressive
Disorder (MDD) were recruited from the Department for
Psychiatry, Psychotherapy, and Psychosomatics of the University
Hospital of Psychiatry Zurich. Patients with neurological or other
physical illnesses, disorders of personality, alcohol- or substance
abuse were excluded. Diagnosis was made according to DSM
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Clinical symp-
toms were assessed with the BDI II (Beck et al., 1996) and the
Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton, 1960). After execution of
the MIPQS, patients were asked to perform the relevance task
(as described above) using the experimental control software
Presentation® (Neurobehavioral Systems). Ratings for each item
were related to the number of the column chosen by the patient
in the MIPQS using Spearman rank correlations.
COURSE OF THE EXPERIMENT
The fMRI experiment is embedded in a large-scale psychotherapy
outcome study. We investigate changes in depressed patients
during 1 year of psychodynamic psychotherapy concerning
psychodynamic, behavioral and neuronal parameters. Different
instruments are employed for the evaluation of these changes,
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such as the OPD interview, fMRI examination and a series
of questionnaires: MIPQS (Maladaptive Interpersonal Patterns
Q-Sort; Zimmermann et al., accepted), OPD-SF (“OPD Struktur-
Fragebogen,” [OPD Structure Questionnaire]; Ehrenthal et al.,
2012), BDI (Beck et al., 1996), BAI (Beck Anxiety Inventory),
BHI (Beck Helplessness Inventory), FKBS (“Fragebogen zu
Konfliktbewältigungsstrategien,” [Questionnaire on Coping
with Conflicts]; Hentschel et al., 1998), IIP-D (Inventar zur
Erfassung Interpersonaler Probleme [Inventory of Interpersonal
Problems] Horowitz et al., 2000), HCSC (“Heidelberger
Umstrukturierungsskala,” [Heidelberg Structural Change Scale]).
A specific focus is set on changes in interpersonal behavioral
patterns such as evaluated by the MIPQS. The IRPS will be
employed during the fMRI examinations. The procedure for the
fMRI experiment will roughly be described here after.
In a first step, participants rate the MIPQS and the IRPS. Six
pictures representing the most typical interpersonal situations
for each participant are selected. Participants are then invited
to develop a personal narrative for every one of the six tar-
get pictures. Ideally, this determines the individual meaning of
each one of these stimuli. After, participants proceed to fMRI
examinations. Instructions include a structured description of
the task. Before proceeding to the fMRI examination, partici-
pants perform a trial run. Stimuli are presented in a block-design
in randomized order. Four experimental conditions are used in
the scanning procedure. In a first condition (“typical”) the six
target pictures are presented. A second condition (“untypical”)
consists of pictures rated beforehand by the participants as being
not typically representative for their interpersonal behavior. The
control condition (“neutral”) includes pictures showing a num-
ber from two to four stick figures in a frontal, neutral position
(see Figure 3B). Finally, a resting condition (“rest”) showing a
black fix-cross on white background is included. In order to eval-
uate subjective experience during the “Typical” and “Untypical”
condition, a nine-point Likert scale is presented after every pic-
ture during the scanning procedure. Participants are asked to rate
the level of personal involvement experienced while watching the
pictures. In the “neutral” condition subjects are asked to report
the number of stick figures presented in every picture. Stimuli
are presented using Presentation® and all feedbacks are given
using a trackball response pad (Current Designs®). The exper-
imental design was optimized for further analysis of effective
connectivity.
DISCUSSION
We have illustrated our attempt to develop an individualized
neuro-imaging paradigm. As mentioned before, the choice and
selection of the behavioral task employed during fMRI examina-
tions is of vital importance. We have chosen to base the behavioral
task on a validated instrument (MIPQS) describing a central
dimension in psychodynamic psychotherapy: changes in inter-
personal behavior and associated feelings. We hence try to isolate
a specific mechanism relevant in the psychodynamic treatment
of depression and operationalize it in an fMRI experiment. The
experiment incorporates a number of specific principles that are,
in our view, of great importance for this type of experimental
design.
First, focus is set on the very individual dimension of experi-
ence as well as their emotional implications. This is reflected in
the individual choice and subjective determination of meaning of
stimuli (IRPS pictures) used during neuro-imaging.
Second, the association of the picture to autobiographical
experience should strengthen the affective reaction of the partici-
pant when the IRPS pictures are presented in the scanner. During
the scanner procedure, participants rate their subjective emo-
tional arousal induced by the IRSP pictures. Having a subjective
rating of this kind enhances the validity of the experiment.
Third, the use of visual stimuli in form of pictures may reduce
the cognitive demand on participants during fMRI examinations
compared to tasks involving stimuli using words or sentences.
Fourth, the fMRI experiment comprises a valid control condi-
tion. The control condition consists in presentation of (a) IRPS
pictures that the patient rated as non-relevant for himself; (b)
pictures showing stick figures in a neutral position.
Results of fMRI exams will be linked to results from other
diagnostic instruments such as the OPD and a series of others
questionnaires. By the choice of these instruments, we tempt to
take into account the complexity of subjective experience.
There are several factors that have been pointed out ear-
lier to be relevant for the design of neuro-imaging paradigms
in psychodynamic research that are not taken into account in
our paradigm. This includes factors resumed under the “design
problem” as well as those evoked concerning the “translational
problem.” For example, we have not considered the psychother-
apist or the therapeutic relationship as “input” in depth. Our
design includes one questionnaire possibly giving a hint on the
matching of therapist and patient (IIP-D) but it does not include
personality or attachment style ratings for the therapist. Ideally,
this should also be taken into account. To give another exam-
ple, we also need to carefully consider our hypothesis concerning
neural activation during fMRI exams and take into account con-
siderations illustrated earlier with reference to “the investigator as
input.”
Our experimental paradigm does not aspire to satisfy
all of the requirements that experimental designs in psy-
chodynamic psychotherapy research using neuro-imaging
should ideally fulfill and which were described earlier in
this article. In this vast and complex research domain, the
development of adequate and valid experimental designs
stays a defiant methodological challenge. Our experimen-
tal paradigm represents a further step into this direction. It
aspires to create an experimental design that does reflect—
even though in a limited way—the complexity of subjective
experience.
CONCLUSION
We discussed the methodological problems in designing a brain
imaging study to measure neural effects of psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy. Two main problems, the design problem and the
translation problem, were encountered. The design problem
points to the many inputs including the psychotherapist himself,
the client, and the investigator, which each by itself may need to
be included as distinct experimental variables in the study design.
The translation problem refers to the different levels involved in
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such project such as the personal vs. the neuronal level, the psy-
chodynamic vs. the process level, and the First-Person level vs. the
Third-Person level. Thereby the personal vs. the neuronal level is
of particular interest in that it includes conceptually and empir-
ically relevant distinctions like persons vs. brains, generality vs.
individuality, and organization vs. content.
Taken together, this demonstrates that brain imaging studies
of the neural effects of psychodynamic psychotherapy are con-
fronted with a rather high degree of complexity raising various
conceptual, empirical, and experimental problems. The discus-
sion of these problems shall not discourage future investigators;
instead it shall provide them with some suggestions for guidance
through the jungle of complexity. Though any such investigation
requires multi-professional efforts and emphatic collaboration,
we are sure the merits are highly rewarding. The complexity of
investigating the neural effects of psychodynamic psychother-
apy mirrors in an almost paradigmatic way the complexity of
our brain so that neuro-psychodynamic findings entail insight
and a better understanding of the general principles of neural
organization and our brain’s very human nature. The answer
to this question is two-fold: on one hand we do think that by
revealing the neural mechanisms underlying psychotherapeutic
processes, we may be able to develop more specific protocols
of psychotherapy in orientation to the respective neural func-
tions associated with the respective region. For instance, taking
a rather simplistic example, if the level of neural activity in the
amygdala may be involved in psychotherapeutic processes and
even be predictive of psychotherapeutic outcome, it may be an
additional indicator that the involvement of emotions may have
been crucial in psychotherapeutic success. This may be the case
even if the therapy was not emotion-focused but rather ori-
ented in psychodynamic mechanisms. Such results may then
be considered as evidence for the central involvement of emo-
tional processes in the psychodynamic processes which may then
lead to further refinement and specification of psychotherapeu-
tic protocols. This raises not only the question for the link-
age between emotions and psychodynamic processes but also
how we, for example, can address emotions more explicitly in
relation to defense mechanisms in psychotherapy. Such orien-
tation on neural functions may then lead to the development
of neurally-based psychodynamic psychotherapy in the future
and may therefore be empirically, i.e., neurally, more plausible,
and compatible with respect to the brain and its mode of func-
tion than the current purely clinically- and observationally-based
approaches.
On the other hand, revealing the neural mechanisms under-
lying psychotherapeutic processes may also contribute in the
reverse direction, by giving us a better understanding of the
psychological, i.e., psychodynamic, mechanisms associated with
certain patterns of neural activity across different region. Hence, it
is not only that psychodynamic psychotherapy may benefit from
brain imaging but also the other way in that the latter may also be
complemented by the latter.
In summary, we thus assume bilateral exchange and contribu-
tion between psychodynamic psychotherapy and brain imaging.
This may ultimately, as we hope, lead to the development of
diagnostic and therapeutic predictive markers with especially the
latter predicting what subjects may benefit from what kind of psy-
chotherapy in general, and the kind of focus in psychodynamic
psychotherapy in particular.
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